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TRIUMPHANT DEATH: THE 
INTERPENETRATION OF 
ASPIRATIONALISM AND HISTORICISM IN 
U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Ken I. Kersch2 
As someone preoccupied with the nature and processes of 
U.S. constitutional development from an empirical, positivist as 
opposed to a prescriptive, normative perspective—in is rather 
than ought—my interest in contemporary constitutional theory of 
the sort practiced at a high level by Jim Fleming is oblique. I care 
more about history than theories of justice, about how the 
Constitution has actually been read to structure public (and 
private) authority in the United States over time than about 
justifying either the “best” readings of the parameters of that 
authority generally, or worrying in particular about what theory 
of interpretation can justify a judge in exercising his or her 
purportedly problematic “counter-majoritarian” powers of 
judicial review to hold legislation null and void on the grounds 
that it contravenes the nation’s fundamental law.3 When I nod my 
head “yes” about constitutional theory, it is thus most 
immediately over what Michael Dorf identifies as the “‘eclectic’ 
 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Political Science, Boston College. I am grateful to all of the 
participants in the symposium on Jim Fleming’s book at La Universidad Nacional 
Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City (February 2015), and particularly to Jim 
and our wonderful host, Imer Flores. 
 3. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (coining the term “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
6 - KERSCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16 10:47 AM 
424 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:423 
 
accounts” of Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon, scholars who 
find—usefully, but not surprisingly—that over the long course of 
American history, judges have used an array of “modalities,” or 
types of arguments, in publicly justifying their decisions in their 
judicial opinions.4 If one moves beyond judicial opinions to 
constitutional arguments made in the roiling public sphere 
(parties, elections, social movements, interest groups, and diverse 
forms of individual and collective legal consciousness, including 
political and legal claim-making), of course, the modes of 
argument multiply, and the matter overspills the ambit of 
professional, institutional justification.5 There is a lot of is out 
there. 
At the same time, however, certainly in the United States—
and perhaps in many other places as well—there is a lot of 
“ought” in the “is.” What has happened is, in significant part, a 
function of claims made, in various fora, about what should 
happen. There is thus, and always has been, a lot of empirically 
observable and verifiable “aspirationalism” in U.S. historical and 
constitutional development. At the same time, however, there are 
also a lot of empirically, positivistically verifiable appeals to 
heritage and history in American aspirationalism—and that 
aspirationalism also has a history. In light of these dynamics—
both aspects of which Fleming helpfully recognizes in Fidelity to 
Our Imperfect Constitution—Fleming wants to call the fight for 
aspirationalism. But I think the book as a whole shows that we 
can call it a draw: there is no reason, or even grounds, for drawing 
a sharp distinction between one and the other. The extent we feel 
inclined to do so is an artifact of the trajectory of the living 
constitutionalist-originalist debates of mid-to-late twentieth 
century America, debates that Fleming’s book demonstrates, to 
 
 4. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1768 (1997). See generally PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); Richard 
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 1189 (1987). 
 5. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD (2011); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF 
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); GEORGE 
I. LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS TALK IN 1939 AMERICA 
(2012); Emily Zackin, Lost Rights and the Importance of Audience, 49 TULSA L. REV. 421 
(2013). 
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me at least, are, in their most familiar forms, likely not long for 
this world. 
The Living Constitutionalist v. Originalist binary has long 
seemed to me something of a parlor game: it was always a false 
opposition. But Fleming fails to note that Living 
Constitutionalism, Aspirationalism, and Constitutional 
Perfectionism are also “isms.” The two positions—at least in their 
contemporary form in recent constitutional theory, born in an age 
of isms— were mutually constitutive. Fleming’s Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution aspires to transcend this binary and 
reconcile in constitutional theory appeals to history and aspiration 
to the best interpretation. While in the end, he doesn’t fully 
succeed, I do agree with the core of the argument in this book, if 
not its ultimate conclusion. What pleasantly surprises me is the 
degree to which Fleming, a leading Rawlsian and Dworkinian 
constitutional theorist, has incorporated the claims of history and 
the insights of scholars of American political and constitutional 
development (and the legal scholars who commune with them) 
into his otherwise largely “philosophical” work. He suggests that 
the essentials of the key portions of that work that he adopts 
here—about “is,” and the concrete, and “fit”—were in Dworkin 
and Rawls (Political Liberalism) all along—a not wholly 
convincing bit of (creative) mopping up. But this is a matter for 
intellectual historians. The key point is that, as constitutional 
theory, what he sets out here, now, seems mostly to work. 
HISTORY IN ASPIRATIONALISM/PERFECTIONISM 
While recognizing the uses of history in constitutional 
argument and justification, Fleming plainly sees the book’s take-
home point as involving the preeminence of aspiration. Let’s 
focus first on aspirationalism or perfectionism’s concessions to 
history. First is Fleming’s acknowledgement of what (following 
the later Rawls) we may call “political perfectionism.” “[T]o be 
persuasive in our constitutional culture,” Fleming says here, “one 
generally needs to argue that one’s interpretations fit with the 
past, show the past in its best light or fulfill the promises of our 
abstract moral commitments and aspirations.” (p. 108). He makes 
clear, however, that this is in no way a concession to originalism 
(or, at least, to the traditional, “old-time,” hard-form originalism 
of Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia). “It is a moral reading or 
philosophic approach that aspires to fidelity to our imperfect 
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Constitution” (p. 108).6 And Fleming criticizes “constitutional 
theorists who are not narrow originalists [including his earlier 
self?] . . . [for] hav[ing] not paid sufficient attention to how 
arguments based on history, both adoption history and post-
adoption history, function in constitutional law” (p. 136). Here, 
Fleming highly praises recent work by Jack Balkin that does 
precisely this.7 He signs on to the criticism by Balkin and his fellow 
broad originalists of liberals and progressives for ignoring history 
and ceding it to conservatives (pp. 136-37). Fleming is thus now 
favorably disposed towards historical argument in constitutional 
debate (and adjudication) if taken to advance a moral reading and 
not as an alternative to it, with history acting in service to the 
judges engaging in their primary responsibility of exercising moral 
judgment (pp. 91-92). 
At the same time, Fleming distances the constitution-
perfecting, aspirationalist theory with which he has long been 
associated from its longstanding ties to theories of judicial 
supremacy, and takes a friendly stance toward pluralistic, 
“protestant,” and departmentalist models of constitutional 
practice8 (p. 174). He also acknowledges in an unconcerned way 
the history of the plural constitutional forms of justification or 
multiple modalities that have always been used by judges in their 
judicial opinions—that is, the observations highlighted in the 
eclectic accounts of Bobbitt and Fallon. In doing this, Fleming 
here distances himself from living constitutionalism as an “ism” 
(p. 57). 
Fleming’s model, however, retains a clear hierarchy of 
values, with history in the subservient or instrumental role, 
honored rather than (necessarily) followed, servant, not rival, to 
justice. While he certainly affords a role to historical arguments in 
American constitutionalism, he is express—and emphatic—about 
their subsidiarity: they are at most minor premises to philosophy’s 
major premises about justice and the nature of the good. 
This is problematic. I agree with Fleming’s conclusion that 
fidelity is indispensable to any plausible constitutional theory: I, 
for one, count this commitment to a duty to fidelity as yet another 
 
 6. For more on “inclusive originalism,” see William Baude, Is Originalism Our 
Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015), which Fleming cites for this point. (p. 193 n.2). 
 7.  See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 641 (2013). 
 8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).  
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of originalism’s victories—though Fleming insists it was there in 
Dworkin all along.9 It was, after all, originalists who most centrally 
and insistently tied the duty of fidelity to the Constitution’s status 
as law, arguing that it was inherent in the very concept of the rule 
of law (though, to be sure, they were hardly the only to note or 
mention it). Law as fidelity was originalism’s great thrust.10 
But Fleming’s position on history as handmaiden underplays 
its indispensability as living constitutionalism’s life force. 
Fleming’s failure to afford this reality its due highlights his 
vestigial monism, in a book that breaks new ground in his 
theoretical project in reconciling itself with constitutional 
pluralism. Monism is hierarchical. And Fleming’s fondness for 
philosophical clarity, for setting out hypotheses, premises, major 
and minor, and the like in the form of formal logic, necessarily 
entails this monistic hierarchy of values, in which justice is the 
major premise and history the minor one. This is, I submit, the 
wrong way to look at it. 
There is a history here that Fleming does not tell in Fidelity 
to Our Imperfect Constitution, perhaps because that history is 
about the relationship over time between academic (and 
particularly legal academic) constitutional theory and 
party/movement politics driven by an underlying politics of 
conservativism v. progressivism/liberalism. While he takes some 
steps in the direction of emphasizing a non-binary, inter-
penetrating complexity, Fleming’s hierarchy remains wedded to 
an ostensibly history-spurning “living constitutionalism,” set in 
opposition to an aspiration-spurning originalism. But this is a 
relatively contemporary construction, pitting “ism” against “ism.” 
I will discuss conservatism later. But let’s take progressivism/
liberalism first. 
 
 9. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 10. This was true as well for the earlier liberal originalism of Hugo Black, who was 
disturbed, for example, by Earl Warren’s casual indifference to its rule of law claims in his 
opinion for the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (“In 
approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment 
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider 
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public 
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.”). See generally JON 
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
(1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, 
AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).  
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If living constitutionalism is understood as a common 
modality involving adjustment of constitutional understandings to 
take into account altered conditions, it, in fact, has a history that 
dates back to the beginning of the country, and doubtless 
before—which is why it is easy enough to go back and cherry-pick 
ancient quotations to hurl at originalist opponents in 
contemporary constitutional controversies (for example, “It is a 
constitution we are expounding . . . adapt[able] to the various 
crises of human affairs.”).11 It is also why there is truth underlying 
David Strauss’s model of living constitutionalism as common law 
constitutionalism. But living constitutionalism as an “ism”—that 
is, as the one right way to do things, as forged against some 
intransigent, conservative roadblock/barrier school of thought 
that insisted otherwise—was born in the late nineteenth/early 
twentieth centuries, and issued from two different and distinctive 
wellsprings. The first was indubitably morally aspirationalist: it 
involved aspirationalist conceptions of justice and equality, as 
read into (typically) the rights provisions of the Civil War 
Amendments (particularly the Fourteenth) and the invocation in 
constitutional argument of the natural rights claims of the 
Declaration of Independence. This aspirationalism was reformist, 
and reform/social movement aspirationalism, as pioneered by 
women’s rights advocates and abolitionists before the Civil War, 
maintained its momentum in an ongoing trajectory, following 
these textual additions, after the War.12 While commonly 
considered an approach of the reformist left, this same moral 
aspirationalism was applied to the concept of liberty/freedom by 
the Supreme Court’s Lincoln appointees like Justice Stephen 
Field and subsequent Republican appointees like (Ulysses S. 
Grant appointee) Joseph Bradley and other “Lochner era” 
conservatives. While random natural law claims, of course, dated 
back to the country’s beginning and before (natural law as a 
modality in a generally pluralist framework) when it was joined 
 
 11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
 12. See J. DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN PERSUASION: REMAKING 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1993); Michael Vorenberg, Bringing the Constitution Back In: 
Amendments, Innovation, and Popular Democracy During the Civil War Era, in THE 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 120 
(Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003); Hendrik Hartog, The 
Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights that Belong to Us All,” 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 
(1987); see also ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2012). 
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with the reform movement thrust of abolitionism, natural law as 
natural rights became a way of life for many U.S. 
constitutionalists, and a cause—it became an “ism”.13 
The second wellspring of modern living constitutionalism 
was quite different. This was progressive majoritarianism, 
premised on a robustly democratic reading of the (best) 
constitutional order—the very reading Fleming rightly recognizes 
in the recent work of Sandy Levinson. This democratic/
majoritarian living constitutionalism had an anti-legal (or anti-
fidelity) thrust, at least as applied to the powers of the courts to 
police constitutional boundaries. This progressive living 
constitutionalism came in different forms, of course, from the 
minimally legalist (Thayer’s “clear mistake” rule, and Holmes’s 
similar approach) to anti-constitutionalist/pure majoritarianism 
of some of that era—nicely canvassed recently by Aziz Rana—
that Fleming rightly recognizes in the recent work of Mike 
Seidman. From a populist constitutional perspective, of course, 
majoritarianism can be morally aspirational, with the populace 
making moral arguments in the public sphere for legislation. But 
it is not so much a moral reading of the Constitution as a call for 
the Constitution to get out of the way of the aspiring, 
perfectionist, justice-seeking people.14 
 
 13. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 133 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
While an issue in an array of contexts, the problem natural law foundations posed for 
chattel slavery was always beneath the surface in the early republic, and only rose higher 
over time. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 836 (D. Mass. 1822); 
Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500 (1772); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE 
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER, 
NATURAL LAW AND THE ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2012). In a 
recent book, John Compton has provocatively traced the living constitutionalism 
underlying the expansion of the modern New Deal state to evangelical reformist origins. 
See JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
(2014). Oddly, his book largely omits a discussion of abolitionism and slavery, but usefully 
focuses on late nineteenth century religious reformism as applied to drinking and 
gambling. See id. at 3–6 (describing national morals regulation as breakthrough/critical 
juncture to expansions of the powers of the central administrative/social regulatory state). 
 14. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); 
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012); Aziz Rana, 
Progressivism and the Disenchanted Constitution, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: 
POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE (Stephen Skowronek, Stephen Engel, & Bruce Ackerman eds., 2016); 
James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). There are, of course, moral arguments for democracy, 
but I will demur on those here. It is worth noting that, while they welcome change and 
evolution, these two forms of living constitutionalism, the legalist and the anti-legalist, can 
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There is then the middle ground—close to Fleming (and 
Balkin’s) middle ground today—which takes the text as the 
starting point of constitutional interpretation, but holds that much 
of the text is either deliberately (or simply factually) broad and 
indeterminate and recommends that we should—indeed, must, 
inevitably—interpret it in light of our current needs, objectives, 
and aspirations.15 Like Jack Balkin today, Woodrow Wilson, 
writing almost exactly one century before (borrowing, I believe, 
from Dicey), set out the metaphor of the Constitution as a house 
that needs to be “built out” over time. Wilson too wrote about the 
“construction zone”: 
Sometimes, when I think of the growth of our economic system, 
it seems to me as if, leaving our law just about where it was 
before any of the modern inventions or developments took 
place, we had simply at haphazard extended the family 
residence, added an office here and a workroom there, built up 
higher on our foundations, and put out little lean-tos on the 
side, until we have a structure that has no character 
whatsoever. Now, the problem is to continue to live in the 
house and yet change it. Well, we are architects in our time, and 
our architects are also engineers. We don’t have to stop using 
a railroad terminal because a new station is being built. We 
don’t have to stop any of the processes of our lives because we 
are rearranging the structures in which we conduct these 
processes. What we have to undertake is to systematize the 
foundations of the house, then to thread all the old parts of the 
structure with the steel which will be laced together in modern 
fashion, accommodated to all the modern knowledge of 
structural strength and elasticity, and then slowly change the 
partitions, relay the walls, let in the light through new 
apertures, improve the ventilation; until finally, a generation or 
two from now, the scaffolding will be taken away, and there 
will be the family in a great building whose noble architecture 
will be at last disclosed, where men can live as a single 
community, co-operative as in a perfected, coordinated 
beehive, not afraid of any storm of nature, not afraid of any 
artificial storm, any imitation of thunder and lightning, 
knowing that the foundations go down to the bedrock of 
principle, and knowing that whenever they please they can 
 
also be read in stark opposition to each other (see, for example, Lincoln and his 
commitment to the equality of natural rights as a representative of the first, and Stephen 
Douglas, and his commitment to popular sovereignty, as a representative of the second). 
 15. See Charles A. Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 29, 34 (1936). 
6 - KERSCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16 10:47 AM 
2016] ORIGINALISM’S TRIUMPHANT DEATH 431 
 
change that plan again and accommodate it as they please to 
the altering necessities of their lives.16 
It is notable that all of these first generation of living 
constitutionalists were famous adepts at embedding their theories 
in history. They all told stories, stories about the founding, stories 
about the Civil War, stories about the progress of man. Many—
perhaps most—of these stories had a strong patriotic theme (it is 
worth noting that while Balkin teaches us about construction 
zones in an academic journal, Wilson set out his theory in public 
speeches, subsequently assembled into a presidential campaign 
manifesto, The New Freedom, which he leveraged to win the 
White House). Progressives, in particular, were highly 
nationalistic and patriotic. Herbert Croly’s New Nationalism, to 
take just one (triumphant) example, justified change by re-
narrating the founding and its relation to necessary changes in the 
present, calling famously for the achievement of Jeffersonian ends 
by Hamiltonian means.17 None insisted on justice as major 
premise and history as minor premise: they were two sides of the 
same coin. This is not unrelated to their ultimate success. 
Accordingly, while Fleming has gone a long way in the right 
direction, this, in my view, is the next step: his next book should 
take it. 
Although he can’t quite break with a monism that makes 
history the handmaiden of philosophy, Fleming does evince an 
understanding of this in this book in a way much more 
pronounced than he ever has before. He acknowledges 
originalism’s appeal not just as a matter of the philosophy of the 
rule of law, and hermeneutics, but in the United States in 
particular, as a concrete country, with a history and a tradition—
indeed, a heritage: what Fleming calls “our constitutional 
practice” (p. 60). He says “it is . . . likely that there are contingent 
reasons for originalism’s normative appeal . . . in the United 
States”—as if this “contingency” itself were a flaw in what would 
otherwise be the glassy smooth surface of principle, rather than 
what countries and peoples actually are18 (pp. 65-66). Still, 
Fleming rightly acknowledges that contemporary originalists, all 
 
 16. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF 
THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 50–52 (1914).  
 17. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909).  
 18. In this, he is following the path of the later Rawls (of Political Liberalism (1993)) 
as against the earlier Rawls (A Theory of Justice (1971)), in his own constitutional sphere. 
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theories of legal obligation and judicial role and duties aside, are 
appealing to the constitutional nationalism and “constitutional 
patriotism” of Americans, a point earlier noted by both Dorf and 
Balkin, which Fleming acknowledges and adopts.19 While it is 
worth qualifying this point by remembering that, to some extent, 
this too is a construction—see Michael Kammen’s cultural history 
of Constitution-worship as trajectory, and Madison’s efforts to set 
the public off the scent (to a certain extent) of the sayings and 
doings of the Founders—it is still very much there, and as much 
more than just a theory informing approaches to interpretation by 
professionals.20 It is a political vision. When this vision was 
employed by conservatives to oppose the rulings and reasoning of 
the liberal, living constitutionalist Warren Court devoted to “the 
pursuit of justice,” in the (ostensible) defense of an 
abandoned/betrayed (and, later, a “lost” or “exiled” 
Constitution), the living constitutionalists were both (initially) 
triumphant, and set for a major fall. Fleming himself (and 
Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and the rest) were once very far out 
on that plank. Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution is Fleming’s 
laudable attempt to walk himself back.21 
And so we get a new seriousness about history, in what 
Fleming is careful to ascribe as its proper place. His philosophic 
approach “would use history for what it teaches rather than for 
what it purportedly decides for us. In a constructivist world, we 
would understand that history is a jumble of open possibilities, not 
authoritative, determinate answers” (p. 22). He gives high praise 
to “constructivist” constitutional theory, describing it as the best 
new work in the field, work that “acknowledges the place of 
history—most notably, original meaning, post-adoption history, 
and precedent—as sources of constitutional interpretation. It not 
only recognizes the limitations of history but also appreciates the 
uses of history (which are different from conventional originalist 
 
 19. Balkin reaffirms Dorf on “ancestral” and “heroic” originalism. See Balkin, supra 
note 7, at 682 n.120. 
 20. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). But see DAVID J. SIEMERS, RATIFYING 
THE REPUBLIC: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND FEDERALISTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2002). 
 21. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
(1998); Justice William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Constitution 
of the United States: Contemporary Ratification (Oct. 12, 1985), 
staffweb.wilkes.edu/kyle.kreider/Brennan.doc (last accessed Apr. 18, 2016); see also 
LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).  
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uses of history)” (p. 20). Fleming appropriately analogizes this 
constructivism to the turn taken by Rawls in Political Liberalism, 
characterizing it as a quest for the best interpretation, with history 
a part of the quest, while carefully noting that “[h]istory is, can 
only be, and should only be a starting point in constitutional 
interpretation” (p. 21). 
ASPIRATIONALISM IN HISTORICISM 
Following the scholarship in what I recently learned is a new 
scholarly literature in “the history of originalism,” Fleming rightly 
notes that originalism as an “ism”—as opposed to one 
longstanding modality of constitutional interpretation—is 
actually a relatively new phenomenon: it essentially begins with 
Robert Bork, Edwin Meese, and Raoul Berger, forged in reaction 
to the Warren Court. Part of my own contribution to that new 
literature has been to underline the degree to which newish 
originalism as an “ism” (what Whittington calls “old” originalism, 
and I have called “reactive” originalism) is only contingently 
linked to conservatism, theoretically and historically. This old, 
reactive originalism by the Right represented, in many respects, a 
revival of majoritarian, democratic, judicial-restraintist, “clear-
mistake” progressivism: the charge against Warren Court liberals 
by the Old/Reactive originalists was hypocrisy (“you criticized 
judicial activism and Lochner and judges reading their own 
politics into law—and, look, you are doing the same thing!”).22 In 
this majoritarian, democratic, anti- or minimally constitutionalist 
guise, originalism as an “ism” was the antithesis of 
aspirationalist/perfectionist moral readings of the Constitution. 
In chapter one of Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 
Fleming has his own charge of hypocrisy to lodge against 
contemporary conservative originalists like Michael McConnell, 
Steven Calabresi, and others, faint-hearted in the face of charges 
that strict originalism would de-legitimize things like Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954)’s reading of the Fourteenth 
 
 22. Ken I. Kersch, Constitutional Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era, in 
THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, 
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE, supra note 14 [hereinafter Kersch, 
Constitutional Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era]; Ken I. Kersch, 
Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive Development of Constitutional 
Conservatism in National Review, 1955–1980, 25 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 86 (2011) 
[hereinafter, Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism].  
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Amendment’s equal protection clause to bar sex discrimination, 
and/or (for some) due process liberty to protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination. Fleming charges them with adopting 
the view, virtually indistinguishable from Dworkin’s aspiration/
moral concept/conception approach, that purports to be grounded 
in the authority of these relatively abstract textual constitutional 
provisions, but recognizes, implicitly, that the provisions must be 
read in light of updated understandings of the requirements of 
justice, liberty, and equality.23 In doing so, these originalists have 
forfeited the claim for originalism as a stay against (supposedly 
unconstrained, free-wheeling, subjective/political) living 
constitutionalism in its moral reading guise. Fleming’s argument 
here is dead-on—exactly right. 
The problem, however, is that, as I have emphasized in recent 
work, conservatives as a group, and conservative 
constitutionalists, have never claimed to be opposed to moral 
readings of the Constitution: this opposition is an artifact of 
constitutional theory as practiced in the law schools by law 
professors. While that might have seemed to be the world to legal 
academics, it was never the world of either the wider conservative 
movement, or even conservative constitutional theorists, many of 
whom were not law professors, but political scientists and political 
philosophers. 
Of course, the early modern constitutional conservatives like 
Justice Field were aspirationalist moralists about individual 
liberty: it was Field, after all, who in his Slaughterhouse dissent 
(1873) insisted on an expansive—indeed, revolutionary—reading 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s new rights provisions. To read it 
otherwise, Field said, would render the Amendment’s adoption 
“a vain and idle enactment.”24 This is the reason that Justice Hugo 
Black, who knew whereof he spoke, insisted that any ruling that 
smacked of Lochnerism amounted to a return to “natural law.” 
But there is a much more proximate aspirationalist/moralist 
conservative constitutionalism to be found in the postwar 
constitutional theory of the Straussians—of men like Martin 
Diamond, Harry V. Jaffa, and Walter Berns. These people 
sometimes disagreed vehemently, at times viciously, about many 
 
 23. Baude, supra note 6; see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and 
Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 101 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism 
and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1140 (1995). 
 24. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
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things (the antagonism between the East Coasters (Allan Bloom 
and Walter Berns, for example, and the West Coasters (Jaffa) was 
especially pronounced). But Straussianism was defined by its 
insistence on substantive moral ends in politics and 
constitutionalism, the source of the foundational distinction 
Straussians drew between ancient and modern political thinkers 
(Plato and Aristotle, e.g., versus Machiavelli and Hobbes). These 
mid-century constitutional theorists were quite explicit in 
opposing the pure majoritarianism and legal positivism they 
associated with Progressivism.25 Since Bork and Scalia’s 
originalism is positivism, and genealogically Progressive, these 
conservative constitutional theorists have always set themselves 
in opposition to Bork and Scalia (on the current Court, Clarence 
Thomas is their man). Let me emphasize that, while these people 
may be largely unknown to constitutional theorists in the legal 
academy, they are, and have long been, major thinkers on the 
constitutional Right. As men trained in political philosophy 
(mostly) at the University of Chicago, it is worth adding, they 
brought an immense intellectual sophistication to their 
constitutional theory: this is not fringe constitutional theory, or 
lesser constitutional theory, but very serious stuff. 
Fleming’s focus on the recent updating originalism of 
McConnell, Calabresi, and others raises a different dimension of 
all this, and one that sounds in legal theory, intellectual history, 
and American constitutional development. As a matter of legal 
theory, this development was inevitable. While it is true that an 
intransigent fundamentalism that brooks no adjustment or 
accommodation to change can be surprisingly durable—and, to 
some fanatics, holds an enduring appeal26—this is less than likely 
 
 25. The same was true of the Roman Catholic constitutional theory of roughly the 
same period. It is no coincidence that, these days, many Straussians are housed at Catholic 
universities. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, SJ, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960); Kersch, Constitutional 
Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era, supra note 22; Ken I. Kersch, Beyond 
Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV. 
229, 249 (2011); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).  
 26. Consider, for example, the problem of Islamic fundamentalism—one of the chief 
scourges of our time, or the Roman Catholic extreme Right (though even they, 
conveniently, don’t argue today, as Catholic theology once did, that any artificial form of 
pain relief or sedations, for a headache, surgery, or an excruciating disease, contravened 
natural law, and the naturalness of human suffering, as lived and exemplified by Christ on 
the Cross). See JOANNA BOURKE, THE STORY OF PAIN: FROM PRAYER TO PAINKILLERS 
(2014). 
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to appeal to the mass in a modern liberal democracy (or perhaps 
even a religion) over the long term. Change will be 
accommodated: what will be debated is the pace of that change. 
Any institution or institutional actor charged with interpreting the 
law, cleric or jurist, who refuses on principle (in a liberal, 
democratic state) to accommodate significant social change, to an 
extent that they arrive at a position wholly divorced from the 
ambient social order will see his or her authority undermined—
just as it would be undermined by the assertion of their authority 
in a progressive way that takes flight from the law they are 
charged with interpreting in a way so far in the vanguard as to be 
divorced from the prevailing social order in precisely the opposite 
direction.27 There have always been conservatives who have 
recognized this: this, after all, is Burkeanism, the philosophy of 
prudent, incremental adjustment and reform, such as, for 
example, in the constitutional theory of, earlier, Philip Kurland, 
and, today, James R. Stoner, Jr. Stoner is a political scientist and, 
once again, if one looks at conservative constitutional theory 
outside of the law schools—where, until very recently, most 
conservative constitutional theory was written and practiced in 
modern, postwar United States—the opposition between the 
conservatives and the liberals (for example, David Strauss) is not 
all that stark.28 
But there’s more to it than (conservative) Burkeanism. The 
most prominent postwar non-legal academy constitutional 
theorists—theorists as visible and influential as Martin Diamond, 
Walter Berns, and Brent Bozell—were consistent and express in 
holding that the Constitution would have to be interpreted to take 
into account social change. As philosophers rather than lawyers 
(Bozell being the exception), these conservatives preferred 
subtlety to throwing down the gauntlet on behalf of an extreme 
and intransigent position and then daring their opponents (as 
lawyers tend to do) to take a diametrically opposite point of view 
 
 27. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
(1981). 
 28. For examples of conservative constitutional theory, see generally PHILIP B. 
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); JAMES R. 
STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1992); JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW 
LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003); Philip B. Kurland, 
American Systems of Laws and Constitutions, in AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 141 (Daniel J. 
Boorstin ed., 1972). 
6 - KERSCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16 10:47 AM 
2016] ORIGINALISM’S TRIUMPHANT DEATH 437 
 
(e.g. fidelity v. morality). Long before Dorf, Balkin, and Fleming, 
Martin Diamond argued that we owed the Founders immense 
respect both because they illuminated the principles upon which 
our political order rests and because they were learned and wise, 
but that we are not in any strict way bound by a duty of blind 
obeisance to follow their dictates.29 Viewed in this context, the 
charge lodged against conservatives that they too are 
aspirationalists and moral readers, and take into account social 
change over time, is both right and beside the point. It is a very 
useful point to make as law professors are poised to write the next, 
and perhaps the final, chapter in the “ism” v. “ism” debates that 
have driven constitutional theory in the law schools for more than 
a generation. But in the broader ongoing debates between 
conservative and liberal constitutionalists in politics—in a context 
in which conservative aspirationalism is ascendant and the 
concern for “judicial restraint” is waning—the gotcha charge is 
likely to be greeted by little more than a shrug. As Reva Siegel 
and Robert Post have rightly emphasized, the battle now is over 
the substantive liberal and conservative visions.30 
CONCLUSION 
Fleming’s Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution is both 
highly significant and a sign of the times. Starting from the 
Dworkinian/aspirationalist/moral perfectionist premises where 
he has situated his normative constitutional theory across his 
distinguished career, Jim Fleming has now moved to consider in a 
sustained way the appropriate place of history in constitutional 
interpretation. While it may be true that, in some sense, the school 
to which Fleming has long belonged acknowledged history (in its 
proper place), denied judicial supremacy, accepted the premises 
of departmentalism, popular constitutionalism, and “protestant” 
constitutional pluralism—as Fleming staunchly insists here—
against longstanding, widespread (and, he insists, mistaken) 
scholarly perception, moral aspirationalists can certainly not be 
taken to have been preoccupied or identified with these positions 
 
 29. See Kersch, Constitutional Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era, supra 
note 22; Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 99.  
 30. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 26 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); see also 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373 (2007). 
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over the years. But in a conservative era these preoccupations and 
premises have now set the agenda for the field for more than a 
generation. It is at this point that Fleming, in this book, steps in 
to, at length, fashion his reckoning with this reality. 
In a sense, Fleming here holds the line: aspiration, he argues, 
is, and must be, primary. Historicism is “subsidiary,” and 
instrumental, playing a supporting role in the quest for moral 
perfectionism. My comments here looked at this the other way 
round, emphasizing, in an empirical and positivist spirit, that 
aspirationalism and moral perfectionism are history. And they are 
a particularly prominent part of American history. In interesting 
ways, they are baked into the core of the American national and 
constitutional experiment, which is both liberal and 
providentialist. Moral aspirationalism took center stage with the 
waxing of disputes over chattel slavery, the Civil War, and the 
addition of the Constitution’s Civil War Amendments. It was the 
Union victory in the Civil War that launched aspirationalism, 
constitutional perfectionism, and living constitutionalism as 
“isms.” But it wasn’t until much later—with the political theory of 
John Rawls (Theory of Justice (1971)), the legal theory of Ronald 
Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously (1977)), and their progeny—
which prominently includes Fleming himself—that a more rooted, 
nationalist, patriotic, historically-minded, story-telling and 
narrating aspirationalism/perfectionism/living constitutionalism 
insisted in a sustained way that, in the realm of constitutional 
theory and politics, philosophy was higher and better, and history 
was lesser and lower. This, of course, was a recipe to both 
mandarin academic detachment and public irrelevance. 
Conservative originalists seized upon this presumptuous, self-
satisfied detachment, riding the vulnerabilities of Fleming’s 
school all the way to the top—to the point where, as Fleming 
himself acknowledges, the best new work on constitutional theory 
(that reaches, by his lights, the right results) starts from 
historicist—and, purportedly, originalist—premises. What 
Fleming does in Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution is make the 
case that work by Balkin, Amar, Ackerman, and other “liberal 
originalists” is actually suffused with—he insists, more formally, 
starts from—moral or philosophical premises. At the same time, 
Fleming recognizes the value of liberal originalists attending to 
history in selling those premises, particularly in American 
political/constitutional culture. And he emphasizes the degree to 
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which even the best new conservative originalism has also adopted 
moral, philosophical aspirationalism in taking right results 
positions on core issues like racial segregation and women’s 
equality, the rejection of which would be politically fraught, if not 
ultimately de-legitimating and discrediting. Fleming reads these 
developments as demonstrating that we must now all 
acknowledge the primacy of moral readings of the Constitution. 
My conclusion, however, is different. I have noted that the 
binary between living constitutionalism and historicism that 
Fleming seeks to transcend here by calling the fight for moral 
readings, while acknowledging the (instrumental/subsidiary/
provisional) significance of historicism, is and has always been 
false when viewed from the broader perspective of the history and 
trajectory of U.S. constitutional thought and development and of 
the contention between progressivism/liberalism and 
conservatism in the United States. This binary is an artifact of the 
hermetic theoretical debates of the mid-to-late twentieth century 
legal academy, which, in a classically legalist battle, pitted a 
morally aspirationalist (or majoritarian positivist) living 
constitutionalism as an “ism” against a historicist originalism as 
an “ism.” Long before this in theory and politics, progressives 
(especially) and liberals, and even radicals (see the speeches of 
the anarchist Emma Goldman and the Socialist Eugene V. 
Debs!), were also robustly historicist, and conservatives—very 
prominent and influential conservatives, and particularly the 
leading conservative constitutional theorists (who, in lots of cases, 
of necessity, given the hegemony of liberalism in mid-to-late 
twentieth century U.S. law schools, plied their trade outside the 
law schools) were also aspirationalists and moral perfectionists. 
The two points of view are, as a matter of fact—and theory—
interpenetrating and interpenetrated. They always have been and 
always will be, at least over the long term, in our actual 
constitutional life and practice. As such, Fleming’s important 
book breaks new ground in its prominent attempt at synthesis. 
But it cannot resist pulling back before a full—and accurate—
synthesis to call the fight for the philosophical, moral readings 
camp. This is an unfortunate conclusion to what is ultimately a 
thoughtful, timely, and engaging contribution to understanding 
the way we live now in the United States, and in U.S. 
constitutional theory. 
 
